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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Government decided that Abu Bakker Qas-
sim and A'del Abdu Al-Hakim never were terrorists, but held
them as prisoners for four years anyway.' These two non-
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Margaret A. Ryan, United States Court of Appeals for
the Armed Forces; J.D. magna cum laude, University of Illinois College of Law (2006).
1. Qassim v. Bush, 407 F. Supp. 2d 198 (D.D.C. 2005).
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combatants were held at the United States Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba, naval station from June 2002 until August of 2006.2 No one
could tell them when they would be released. 3 Federal courts
claimed that they did not have the power to help them.
The two men were originally captured by Pakistani bounty
hunters who were paid five thousand dollars for capturing these
"terrorists." 4  Sometime after the detainees arrived in Guan-
tanamo Bay, a Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) was
held. 5 The CSRT summarily found that they were not enemy
combatants. 6 One would expect that, at a minimum, the United
States Government would have apologized to the men and sent
them home. That is not what happened.
The Government never told these men that they had been found
to be non-combatants, and their status was not known outside of
Cuba until their attorneys were eventually allowed to meet with
them in July 2005. 7 Naturally, the prisoners' attorneys motioned
for their immediate release, filing Writs of Habeas Corpus.8 The
Government argued that it should be allowed to retain custody of
the men because of "the Executive's necessary power to wind up
wartime detentions in an orderly fashion."9 A federal judge, after
finding that the men should indeed go free, nevertheless allowed
the Government to continue holding the men because he did not
believe he could craft an effective remedy. 10 The judge gave the
Government seven days to decide how to fix the problem.
Days later, Senator Lindsay Graham offered an amendment to
the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) which would revoke Abu Bak-
ker Qassim's and A'del Abdu Al-Hakim's right to file a Habeas
petition or "any other action against the United States or its
agents relating to any aspect of ... [their] detention . . . ."11 The
DTA, including the Graham Amendment to the original bill,
passed easily. The DTA has since been amended, in the wake of
2. Qassim, 407 F. Supp. 2d 198.
3. Id.
4. P. Sabin Willett, Detainees Deserve Court Trials, WASH. POST, Nov. 14, 2005, at
A21, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2005/11/13/AR2005111301061.html.
5. Qassim, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 199.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Willett, supra note 4, at A21.
9. Qassim, 407 F. Supp. 2d at 199.
10. Id. at 203.




the Supreme Court's Hamdan v. Rumsfeld opinion in 2006.12 The
detainees discussed above were eventually released by the Presi-
dent after four years of pressure from the international commu-
nity. Senator Graham's jurisdiction-stripping provision remains
in force after the 2006 amendments, and hundreds of prisoners
are still held at Guantanamo Bay, regardless of their CSRT
status. 13
The "Great Writ" of Habeas Corpus is one of the common law's
most venerable traditions, allowing a prisoner to require his jailer
to show why he is being held. 14 It is one of the only rights referred
to in the body of the Constitution rather than in the Bill of
Rights.15 The "Suspension Clause" of the Constitution specifically
limits when the right to file a Writ of Habeas Corpus may be re-
voked. 16
The Writ's purpose has always been to force the Executive to
"show cause" when he detains an individual. 17 Normally, this is
not an issue in wartime because the cause can be succinctly ar-
ticulated - a combatant would return to fight for the enemy if set
free. 18 Because the issue is normally so clear, the common law
exempted from review the Executive's decisions in this particular
realm.19 Ostensibly, when a war ends, the prisoners would be ei-
ther returned to their country of origin, or in more recent epochs,
tried as war criminals by the world community.
The paradigm has shifted. Wars are no longer fought between
sovereign nations. Who is and who is not a combatant in a conflict
has become a matter of subjective judgment based on incomplete
information. The Great Writ must be allowed to shift as well if its
purpose is to be maintained.
The Supreme Court's June 2004 decision in Rasul v. Bush af-
forded non-citizen detainees held at the Guantanamo Bay Naval
Base the right to file Writs of Habeas Corpus in federal court.
20
The DTA then stripped the courts of their power to hear Habeas
petitions in cases coming from Guantanamo Bay in almost all
12. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
13. Josh White, U.S. Sends Home 33 Detainees From Guantanamo Bay, WASH. POST,
Dec. 18, 2006, at Al9.
14. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *133 (describing the Habeas Corpus Act of
1679 as a second Magna Carta).
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
16. Id.
17. WILLIAM F. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 42 (1980).
18. See infra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 58-59 and accompanying text.
20. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004)..
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meaningful circumstances. 21 The express purpose of the DTA's
jurisdiction-stripping provisions was to prevent detainees from
challenging the legality and conditions of their detention. 22
This article focuses on the DTA's jurisdiction-stripping provi-
sions and their net effects on the ability of Guatanamo detainees
to avail themselves of the federal courts, both through Habeas
Corpus and other common law constitutional challenges. 23 Spe-
cifically, it addresses the following issues: whether the Legislative
Branch has the power to remove or limit jurisdiction of a right
based in the Constitution in these circumstances; whether the
provision allowing for an appeal to the D.C. Circuit satisfies the
constitutional right, if one exists; whether a constitutional right to
Habeas Corpus extends to non-citizens; and whether other ave-
nues might be available for detainees to challenge their detention.
Part II examines the long history of the Great Writ. Part III ana-
lyzes the extent to which the DTA currently limits Habeas Corpus
in Guantanamo Bay and the possible constitutional and preceden-
tial challenges the current law might face in federal court. Part
IV recommends that the Supreme Court recognize a constitutional
right to Habeas Corpus. It also recommends changes to the lan-
guage of the DTA's jurisdiction-stripping provisions that would
make it more likely to survive judicial scrutiny while still effectu-
ating the goals of the legislation and giving deference to the Ex-
ecutive in wartime. Finally, Part V concludes that the current
iteration of the DTA is unconstitutional because it cuts off the
right to Habeas Corpus for an individual deemed to be a non-
combatant who is nevertheless still detained by the Executive
Branch.
II. BACKGROUND
In order to articulate a cogent argument about jurisdictional
limitations to Habeas Corpus, one must first look at the long his-
tory of the Writ, from its inception, and the intent of the Framers
when they included it in the Constitution. One must also have an
understanding of the various circumstances in which Congress
21. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2680,
2742-44:
22. See 151 CONG. REC. S12752-53 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2005) (statement of Sen. Gra-
ham).
23. This article declines to analyze the jurisdictional quandary presented by detainee
cases currently pending in the federal courts. Instead, it focuses on the right of detainees
to bring new actions under the amended statutory scheme.
664 Vol. 45
Habeas Corpus
has limited the right. Further, it is important to understand the
current statutory framework under the DTA, including Depart-
ment of Defense guidelines with respect to combatant determina-
tion hearings.
A. The Current Framework
In order to comply with the Supreme Court's decision in Rasul,
the Department of Defense almost immediately began conducting
hearings to determine whether or not detainees were combat-
ants. 24 The Rasul Court required that some sort of process be af-
forded the detainees in the combatant determination; however,
the form of process was to be determined by the Executive. 25 By
conducting hearings and formally calling a prisoner an enemy
combatant through a military commission, the Executive believed
the laws of war, rather than the Constitution, would apply. While
this approach provides some process, it is woefully inadequate in
most circumstances.
The rules for combatant determination hearings were promul-
gated by the Secretary of the Navy just weeks after the Rasul de-
cision. 26 The rules provide for a three-judge panel comprised of
military officers, with at least one Navy captain and one member
of the Judge Advocate General (JAG) Corps.27 Each member of
the panel has an equal vote, and a simple majority is required for
a determination that a detainee is a combatant. 28 Evidence is pre-
sented to the panel by a military officer, preferably a member of
the JAG Corps who is at a minimum a lieutenant in the Navy. 
29
The rules afford the detainee a "personal representative" who is
also a member of the armed forces, is at least the rank of Navy
lieutenant-commander, and is specifically not a JAG officer. 30 The
personal representative is charged with informing the detainee
that he is neither a lawyer, nor the detainee's advocate. 31 Infor-
24. Toni Locy, Tribunal Orders Release of Guantanamo Detainee, USA TODAY, Sept. 8,
2004, http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2004-09-08-gitmo-release-x.htm.
25. Id.
26. Memorandum for Distribution from Gordon England, Secretary of the Navy, on
Implementation of Combatant Status Review Tribunal Procedures for Enemy Combatants
Detained at Guantanamo Naval Base, Cuba (Jul. 29, 2004) (on file with the au-





31. England Memo, supra note 26.
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mation imparted by the detainee to the personal representative
will not be held in confidence and can be used against him. 
32
The detainee may choose to waive participation in the hearings,
but the hearings will continue without his participation. 33 The
detainee may not see any evidence that is declared classified, but
his personal representative may gain access to the information.
34
The detainee may call witnesses on his behalf if they are reasona-
bly available. 35 Military witnesses are not reasonably available if
their military commanders deem them required for combat opera-
tions. 36 Civilian witnesses are not reasonably available if they
cannot be contacted, or if security clearance issues make their
presence a security risk. Non-government personnel are required
to appear at the hearings at their own expense.
37
The Government must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that the detainee is an enemy combatant. 38 All government evi-
dence is accepted with the rebuttable presumption that it is genu-
ine and accurate. 39 Once the panel reaches a decision, it is re-
viewed by the legal advisor to the Director of Combatant Status
Review Tribunals for legal sufficiency. 40 The Director of CSRTs
then makes a final determination as to the detainee's status based
on the recommendation of the panel or refers the case back to the
panel for further deliberation or fact-finding.
41
Under the DTA, the findings of the CSRT are then reviewed by
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
42
The DTA strips federal district courts of jurisdiction over Writs of
Habeas Corpus filed by detainees. 43 The amended statue only al-
lows the D.C. Circuit Court to review whether the CSRT complied
with the standards and procedures set forth by the Department of
Defense. 44 The only individuals who may appeal their cases are










41. England Memo, supra note 26.






challenge the way in which the tribunal carried out its duties. 45
The statute does not indicate whether the Circuit Court's deter-
mination is appealable to the United States Supreme Court.
Detainees are not permitted to challenge the conditions of their
detention or the finding of the CSRT if all of the prescribed proce-
dures are followed. Furthermore, they are not allowed to chal-
lenge their detention after they have been found to be "No Longer
Enemy Combatants" (NLECs), allowing the Executive to hold non-
combatants at Guantanamo indefinitely without legal recourse.
B. The Origins of Habeas Corpus
The Great Writ of Habeas Corpus ad sibjiciendum originated in
the courts of England as part of the country's efforts to shrug off
the dictatorial vestiges of the monarchy. 46 Habeas Corpus was
originally instituted as part of a larger effort to bring about an end
to private revenge killings in eighth century England.47 The rule's
initial purpose was to ensure that individuals were brought before
courts of law before any vengeance was taken. 48 Sir Edward Coke
articulated the principle succinctly when he stated, "it manifestly
appeareth, that no man ought to be imprisoned but for some cer-
tain cause: and these words 'Ad subjiciend Et recipiend,' prove
that cause must be shewed: for otherwise how can the Court take
order therein according to Law.
'49
The Asize of Clarendon was written under Henry 11.50 It con-
tained one of the first references to showing "the body" of a pris-
oner to a court. 51 Up to this point, the Writ was used largely as a
jurisdictional tool.52 Its purpose was to force widely dispersed and
fiercly independent local courts to subjugate their judgments con-
cerning a prisoner to those of the Crown's courts.
53
The Writ continued to evolve throughout the years, and by the
sixteenth century, the first (unsuccessful) interaction between the
45. Id.
46. HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1284 (5th
ed. 2003) (citing William F. Duker, The English Origins of the Writ of Habeas Corpus: A
Peculiar Path to Fame, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 983 (1978)).
47. DUKER, supra note 17, at 14.
48. Id.
49. EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTE OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND ch.
XXIX (5th ed. 1671).
50. Id.
51. 2 ENGLISH HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 407-10 (David Douglas & George Greenway
eds., 1953).




Admiralty and the courts over Habeas was documented in Dol-
phyn v. Shutford.54 Eventually, in Thomilson's Case5 5 and Hawk-
ridge's Case,56 the Writ was put successfully to the Admiralty,
forcing it to deliver prisoners to the common law courts. 57 By forc-
ing the Admiralty to obey the Writ, the courts were able to show
their primacy over the actions of an agent of the Monarchy.
For a time in English history, a return of a Writ stating that a
prisoner was being held by the military "by special command of
his majesty" was considered enough to hold an individual indefi-
nitely. 58 No reason beyond that cursory explanation was deemed
necessary. 59 That changed in 1587 when the common law courts
again engaged in a showdown with the military in Hellyard's
Case.60 In an important step forward for the Great Writ, an Eng-
lish court freed a prisoner held by the army when a Writ issued by
the courts was returned stating only that the prisoner was com-
mitted "by order of Frances Walsingham, principal military secre-
tary of her majesty's household. ' 61  In this way, the courts,
through the Writ, were able to assert their dominance over the
monarch's military agents and force them to either free or turn
over prisoners.
By 1620, Parliament had formed and passed resolutions sup-
porting the ideal that no subject of the Crown should be impris-
oned unless the Crown first showed cause. 62 Chamber's Case
63
was decided the same year. 64 It was the first instance where a
court specifically used Habeas Corpus to free a prisoner who had
been unlawfully jailed by the Monarch's Privy Council, rather
than using it as a means of protecting jurisdiction. 65 This change
showed the evolution of the Writ. Rather than simply enabling a
court to force the Executive to appear and articulate a reason for
54. Id.
55. 77 Eng. Rep. 1379 (C.P. 1605).
56. 77 Eng. Rep. 1404 (C.P. 1617).
57. DUKER, supra note 17, at 39.
58. Id. at 43 (quoting Darnel's Case, 3 How. St. Tr. 1, 3 (1627)). In Darnel's Case, the
barristers for the prisoners argued that the Writ should prevent arbitrary imprisonments of
indeterminate length by the King. They were not successful, as the courts were held to be
merely an arm of the King and were therefore required to do his will. Darnel's Case, 3
How. St. Tr. at 6-7.
59. DUKER, supra note 17, at 43.
60. Id. at 41 (citing Hellyard's Case, 74 Eng. Rep. 455 (C.P. 1587)).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 44-45.
63. 79 Eng. Rep. 717 (K.B. 1629).




the detention, the Writ of Habeas Corpus was now a vehicle to free
someone held by the Executive, regardless of what the detaining
agent asserted. By this time in English history, the Writ was
firmly entrenched as a means for the court to assert its dominance
in matters of detention.
The Habeas Corpus Act was passed by Parliament in 1641, abol-
ishing the Court of the Star Chamber. 66 This court, which was
able to hear sedition cases in secret at the behest of the King with
no right to appeal, was seen as the Crown's last trump card in
preventing courts from using their power under the Great Writ.
67
In abolishing the Star Chamber through the Habeas Corpus Act,
Parliament firmly established that the Writ could be asserted
against any detention ordered by the King.
A second Habeas Corpus act was enacted in 1679. It was called
the "second Magna Carta" by Blackstone. 68 It contained largely
the same text as the previous acts and specifically stated that in-
dividuals imprisoned for non-felonious reasons should be released
upon the filing of a Writ and the provision of appropriate securi-
ties.69 The fully matured Writ now clearly stated that no person
should be held by the Crown without good cause.
1. Early Habeas Corpus in Wartime
From its earliest application, the Writ of Habeas Corpus was
not available for enemy soldiers because the underlying reasons
for their detention were determined to be different from those
purportedly proscribed by Habeas Corpus. 70 During wartime, the
most important reason for detention is preventing a combatant
from returning to the battlefield to inflict more damage. 71 The
66. Id. at 47.
67. Id.
68. BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at *133.
69. Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, available at
http://www.Constitution.org/eng/habcorpa.htm.
70. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004) (citing Yasmin Naqvi, Doubtful Pris-
oner-of. War Status, 84 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 571, 572 (2002) ("[C]aptivity in war is 'neither
revenge, nor punishment, but solely protective custody, the only purpose of which is to
prevent the prisoners of war from further participation in the war"') (quoting Decision of
Nuremberg Military Tribunal, reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT'L L. 172, 229 (1947); W.
WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 788 (rev. 2d ed. 1920) ('The time has long
passed when 'no quarter' was the rule on the battlefield .... It is now recognized that 'Cap-
tivity is neither a punishment nor an act of vengeance,' but 'merely a temporary detention
which is devoid of all penal character.' . . . 'A prisoner of war is no convict; his imprison-
ment is a simple war measure."') (citations omitted); cf. In re Territo, 156 F.2d 142, 145 (9th
Cir. 1946))).
71. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 518.
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detention is viewed as lawful while war is waged. 72 The Writ,
however, did apply in those lands under the control of the English
army after the war ended.73 Further, English courts "confirmed
that the reach of the Writ depended not on formal notions of terri-
torial sovereignty, but rather on the practical question of the exact
extent and nature of the jurisdiction or dominion exercised in fact
by the Crown."74 The Writ applied in any place where England
asserted dominance, regardless of whether puppet governments
staffed by natives of the subjugated land were allowed to rule
nominally.
In 1775, Lord Mansfield held that a Minorcan native could sus-
tain a Writ against the military governor of Minorca. 75 English
courts held that prisoners captured on French ships during wars
with France should receive the right to Habeas Corpus once they
are determined to be neutrals.76 The Writ also applied to slaves
found on American ships docked in England, but bound for Ja-
maica.77 These examples illuminate the basic proposition that,
historically, neither citizenship nor physical presence in England
were necessary for the assertion of the right to Habeas Corpus.
C. History of Habeas Corpus in the Colonies
At the time of the first colonial charter in Virginia, Habeas Cor-
pus was already well established in England and in the territories
controlled by the Crown. The laws of England were generally held
to be part of the common law and therefore applicable in the colo-
72. Id.
73. See King v. Cowle, 97 Eng. Rep. 587, 598-99 (K.B.).
74. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 482 (2004) (citing Ex parte Mwenya, [19601 1 Q.B. 241,
303 (C.A.) (Lord Evershed, M.R.)); see also Brief Amici Curiae of Legal Historians Listed
Herein in Support of the Petitioners at 7 n.15, Rasul v. Bush, Nos. 03-334, 03-343 (D.C. Cir.
Jan. 14, 2004) (citing Daniel J. Hulsebosch, The Ancient Constitution and the Expanding
Empire: Sir Edward Coke's British Jurisprudence, 21 LAW & HIST. REV. 439, 461 (2003));
see also BLACKSTONE, supra note 14, at *107 ("In conquered or ceded countries, that have
already laws of their own, the king may indeed alter and change those laws; but till he does
actually change them, the ancient laws of the country remain, unless such as are against
the law of God, as in the case of an infidel country.') (citing Calvin v. Smith, 77 Eng. Rep.
377 (K.B. 1608)); M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 117 (1755)
(discussing the extension of common English law to Ireland); J. SMITH & T. BARNES, THE
ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM: CARRYOVER TO THE COLONIES 6-7 (1975) ("Under the concepts of
Calvin's Case, if the King put into effect the laws of England for the government of a con-
quered Christian kingdom, no succeeding king could alter them without an act of Parlia-
ment.").
75. Fabrigas v. Mostyn, 20 How. St. Tr. 81 (K.B. 1775).
76. King v. Schiever, 97 Eng. Rep. 551 (K.B. 1759).
77. Sommersett v. Stewart, 20 How. St. Tr. 1, 79-82 (K.B. 1772).
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nies. 78 In 1720, the counsel to the English Board of Trade made
this clear when he stated "[1]et an Englishmen go where he will,
he carries as much of law and liberty with him, as the nature of
things will bear."7
9
The Writ was, at least at the outset, unevenly applied through-
out the colonies. There were several attempts in Massachusetts to
formally adopt the Habeas Corpus Act of 1679, but each was de-
nied by the Privy Council as well as Parliament.80 In New York,
the Carolinas, and Virginia, the Act was applied regularly, either
de facto or de jure, from very early on.8 ' Even where a law had
not been specifically passed recognizing the right, the colonies ac-
cepted a legitimate court's ability to hear a Habeas petition.
In Maryland, the appointed governor argued that the statutory
acts which supported Habeas Corpus had not carried over from
England, and therefore, the Writ was not available to members of
the colony.8 2 Daniel Dulany, writing under the pseudonym Cato,
argued that Englishmen in the colonies were "entitled to the same
Right, and Liberties, with the rest of the Subjects, of the same
Prince, of their Degree, and Condition."8 3 Dulany's position even-
tually carried the day.8 4 In most of the colonies, citizens were very
aware of English liberties and availed themselves of them in the
courts of the colonies without significant hardship.8 5 By 1776, the
common law Writ was available in all thirteen colonies, with or
without a statutory grant from either the local government or the
Crown.8 6
D. The Drafting of Article I, Section 9, Clause 2 and the Intent of
the Framers
The Framers of the Constitution reached a broad consensus at
the Philadelphia Convention that Habeas Corpus should be pro-
tected.8 7 It has generally been accepted that Article I, Section 9,
Clause 2 was inserted into the Constitution to guarantee the right
78. Sommersett, 20 How. St. Tr. at 97.
79. DUKER, supra note 17, at 98.
80. Id. at 101-02.
81. Id. at 104-06.
82. Id. at 107.
83. Id.
84. DUKER, supra note 17, at 115.
85. Id. at 111.
86. Id. at 115.
87. F. Paschal, The Constitution and Habeas Corpus, 1970 DUKE L.J. 605, 608 (1970).
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to Habeas Corpus.88 At the Convention, Charles Pinkney of South
Carolina moved that "[tlhe privileges and benefit of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall be enjoyed in this government in the most
expeditious and ample manner; and shall not be suspended by the
Legislature except upon the most urgent and pressing occasions,
and for a limited time not exceeding months." 89 While the Sus-
pension Clause does not include a specific temporal limitation, it
is apparent from the history of its drafting that permanent sus-
pension of the Writ would have been considered unconstitutional
by its drafters, given the specific, enumerated instances in which
it could be suspended.
Some of the Framers felt that the right to Habeas Corpus
should not be suspended under any circumstances. 90 Others were
of the opinion that it should only be suspended "in cases [when]
Rebellion or invasion ... may require it."91 Eventually, the latter
was approved in substance by the Convention. 92 The Suspension
Clause continued to be discussed after the Convention throughout
the ratification phase. 93 While issues of state's rights with regard
to the clause were debated, individuals on all sides of the great
debate over the Constitution and the Bill of Rights concurred that
a robust Habeas Corpus provision was an important check on the
power of the Executive. 94 The real debate was not over the exis-
tence of the right, but rather over articulating specific limitations
on suspension. The concern, just as in the Bill or Rights, was that
a specific textual inclusion might inadvertently limit the right.
95
The anti-Federalists expressed a great deal of concern that
granting the federal government the power to suspend the Writ
would support tyranny. 96  The Federalists assured the anti-
Federalists that this was in fact not the case; the clause was there
88. See generally id.; Eric M. Freedman, Milestones in Habeas Corpus: Part I: Just
Because John Marshall Said It, Doesn't Make It So: Ex parte Boliman and the Illusory
Prohibition on the Federal Writ of Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners in the Judiciary Act of
1789, 51 ALA. L. REV. 531 (2000).
89. Eric M. Freedman, The Suspension Clause in the Ratification Debates, 44 BUFF. L.
REV. 451, 455 (1996) (citing 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 340-
41 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1966) [hereinafter FARRAND]).
90. Id. at 456.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 457. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, providing '"The Privilege of the Writ of
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it." Id.
93. FARRAND, supra note 89, at 438.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 458.
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to be used only in the gravest emergency and would not be used to
suspend the Writ indefinitely.97 In fact, four states specifically
asked for a clause in the new Constitution guaranteeing the right
to file a Writ of Habeas Corpus without any means of suspen-
sion.98 On the whole, it seems that the Framers' intent, and the
intent of the several states in agreeing to the provision through
ratification, revolved around preventing a return of Star Cham-
ber-like practices by the Executive.
E. Supreme Court Jurisprudence
The Supreme Court has held that Habeas Corpus developed into
a significantly more expansive doctrine than the initial right im-
ported from England. 99 Hart and Wechsler succinctly identify sev-
eral instances of Habeas Corpus that do not involve post-
conviction remediation: 100 the legality of detention in immigration
proceedings, 101 trials before military commissions, 10 2 pre-trial de-
tention, 0 3 extradition to a foreign nation, 104 lack of a prompt hear-
ing after an arrest, 0 5 lack of a prompt trial, 0 6 and disputes con-
cerning the conditions of confinement. 0 7 The unifying issue in
these cases is the wrongful incarceration of an individual without
adequate process provided by the Executive Branch.
While the Great Writ is most often viewed as remedying consti-
tutional violations in criminal convictions, this is certainly not its
sole or even primary purpose. Just as in seventeenth century
England, the primary purpose of Habeas Corpus throughout our
jurisprudence has been to rein in the power of the Executive. Im-
portant comparisons can be drawn between the Guantanamo Bay
detentions and other cases of executive detention, specifically de-
tention based on alien deportation proceedings.
The concerns of some states regarding an affirmative guarantee
of the Writ came into focus in Ex Parte Bollman. 108 In that case,
97. Id.
98. Paschal, supra note 87, at 605.
99. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 380 n.13 (1977) (stating that Habeas Corpus has
expanded "beyond the limits that obtained during the 17th and 18th centuries.").
100. HART, supra note 46, at 1285.
101. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
102. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
103. Exparte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75 (1807).
104. Fernandez v. Phillips, 268 U.S. 311 (1925).
105. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
106. Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S. 484 (1973).
107. Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
108. 8 U.S. 75 (1805).
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where Congress attempted to prevent the federal courts from
hearing a Habeas Corpus case, Justice Marshall opined that the
Legislative Branch might be under some sort of obligation to en-
sure efficient jurisdiction over the Great Writ, "for if the means be
not in existence, the privilege itself would be lost . *..."109 With
these words, Marshall acknowledged that the Suspension Clause
does not merely state the terms under which Congress can sus-
pend Habeas Corpus; by implication, it also guarantees the right.
In I.N.S. v. St. Cyr11° the power of Congress and the Executive
to limit Habeas Corpus via statute was analyzed in the context of
a law preventing Habeas review of an alien deportation proceed-
ing. The Executive argued that a statute passed by Congress and
signed by the President removed the power of federal courts to
hear Habeas Petitions from individuals detained by the Immigra-
tion and Naturalization Service.111 The Supreme Court stated
that there would be grave constitutional issues if it adopted the
Government's position because it would completely prevent aliens
detained by the I.N.S. from availing themselves of the Writ in any
circumstance. 112 The majority addressed Marshall's Bollman
113
opinion and held that Bollman did not stand for the proposition
that a jurisdictional statute was required in order to exercise the
Suspension Clause right. Rather, the "Clause was intended to
preclude any possibility that 'the privilege itself would be lost' by
either inaction or the action of Congress." 114 The Court read the
Constitution as requiring Congress to confer the right to Habeas
on non-citizen detainees held within the country. 
115
While St. Cyr affirmed the right of detainees held within the
country, it did not address the rights of combatants. In Johnson v.
Eisentrager,116 the Supreme Court held that German soldiers cap-
tured in China and held for war crimes in Germany could not
avail themselves of Habeas Corpus. 117 The Supreme Court over-
turned the D.C. Circuit, which had decided the case based on a
constitutional right to the Writ. 118 The circuit court had held that
109. Ex Parte Boflman, 8 U.S. at 95 (1805).
110. 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
111. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 304.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 339 U.S. 763, 791 (1950).




the right to the Writ exists independent of a jurisdictional stat-
ute. 119 The appeals court based this decision on three premises.
First, it reasoned that the Writ is a common law right, which does
not require a statutory vehicle.120 Second, it noted that the Writ
can only be suspended in cases of rebellion or invasion. 121 Third,
the circuit court judged that construing the jurisdictional statute
to prohibit the Writ would render the statute unconstitutional,
which the court should avoid if possible. 1
22
The D.C. Circuit Court analyzed the history of the Writ through
its English heritage and concluded that case law in England and
in the United States supported the conclusion that enemy aliens
could resort to Habeas Corpus. 123 Furthermore, it found that the
jurisdictional validity of a military tribunal could be tested by us-
ing a Writ of Habeas Corpus. 124 The circuit court held that the
Constitution does not distinguish between citizens and non-
citizens, nor does it differentiate between detentions inside the
United States and those in foreign lands over which the govern-
ment maintains control. 
125
In order to distinguish cases where the British Government had
trammeled the rights of non-citizens abroad, the court of appeals
argued that the premise of limited government grounded in the
Constitution makes the power of the Executive fundamentally dif-
ferent from that of the British monarch. 126 England was a monar-
chy, in which virtually unlimited power was vested in parliament
and the King at the time of the cases cited. 127 The United States,
on the other hand, was a democracy, which valued a system in
which no branch of government could run roughshod over rights
outlined in the Constitution. 128 In the judgment of the circuit
court, this fundamental difference in governance required an ex-
119. Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 963-64 (D.C. Cir. 1949).
120. Eisentrager, 174 F.2d at 965.
121. Id. at 966.
122. Id. at 964 (citing Carus Wilson's Case, 115 Eng. Rep. 759 (1845); Ex parte Ander-
son, 121 Eng. Rep. 525 (1861); Rex v. Crewe, 102 Law Times Rep. 760 (Ct. of App. 1910)).
123. Id. (citing Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 66
(1946); Exparte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946)).




128. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 613-14 (1952);
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) ("Whatever power the United States Consti-
tution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy or-
ganizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly ensures a role for all three branches when
individual liberties are at stake.").
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pansion, rather than a contraction, of Habeas in order to effectu-
ate its ideals.
The appellate court addressed the jurisdictional issue further by
reasoning that the detained individual could sue wherever those
with "directive power" over the individual - that is, those respon-
sible for the alleged unlawful detainment - were located. 129 The
issue was not whether the court could exercise power in a foreign
land, but whether it could exercise jurisdiction over members of
the Executive Branch. 130 The D.C. Circuit held that it could. 131
This logic would allow any suit against a military detention to be
brought in Washington D.C., because those with directive power
over such detentions are located there.
Almost fifty years after the Supreme Court overturned the D.C.
Circuit Court decision in Eisentrager, it revisited the issue in Ra-
sul when it held that two Australian and twelve Kuwaiti detainees
held at the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, without
any sort of hearing could avail themselves of the Writ through the
federal statute granting Habeas jurisdiction to the lower courts. 132
The Circuit Court of the District of Columbia, relying on the Su-
preme Court's decision in Eisentrager, held that the detainees
could not file Writs of Habeas Corpus. 133 The Supreme Court re-
versed, significantly limiting its own Eisentrager holding in favor
of the D.C. Circuit's Eisentrager opinion. 134
The Supreme Court held that Habeas is "a Writ antecedent to
statute . . .throwing its root deep into the genius of our common
law."135 Further, the Court held that, "[a]s it has evolved over the
past two centuries, the Habeas statute clearly has expanded Ha-
beas Corpus beyond the limits that it obtained during the 17th
and 18th centuries."'136 The Court analyzed the history of the Writ
in American jurisprudence and concluded that its foremost pur-
pose was to prevent the Executive from trammeling individual
rights. 137 In reaching these first principles upon which the right
129. Eisentrager, 174 F.2d at 967.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 472-73 (2004); see 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006).
133. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 472.
134. Id. at 473.
135. Id. (citing Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 484 n.2 (1945)).
136. Id. at 474 (citing Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 380 n.13 (1977)).
137. Id. "Executive imprisonment has been considered oppressive and lawless since
John, at Runnymede, pledged that no free man should be imprisoned, dispossessed, out-
lawed, or exiled save by the judgment of his peers or by the law of the land. The judges of
England developed the Writ of Habeas Corpus largely to preserve these immunities from
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was based, the court alluded to the D.C. Court of Appeal's holding
and to the six-part test used by that court in its Eisentrager opin-
ion. 138
The Court distinguished its own holding in Eisentrager by point-
ing to the six factors articulated in that case. 139 Those factors
were: alienage, place of capture, place of residence, whether the
detainees were afforded a military tribunal, what crimes they
were convicted of by the tribunal, and whether they were at all
times imprisoned outside of the United States. 140 The Court in-
terpreted those six factors as going to the constitutional, not the
statutory, right to Habeas Corpus. 141 The Eisentrager Court had
concluded that no constitutional right to Habeas existed, given the
factors in that specific case. 142 In reviewing those same factors in
Rasul, the Court came to a different conclusion. 143 The Rasul
Court held that a prisoner who is an alien, was captured outside
the country, was not afforded a tribunal or convicted of a war
crime, and was imprisoned in Guantanamo Bay, had the right to
Habeas Corpus under the pre-DTA version of the Habeas jurisdic-
tional statute. 14
4
According to Stevens's majority opinion, when Eisentrager was
decided there had been a jurisdictional gap in the statutory
framework created by the Court's opinion in Ahrens v. Clark.
145
The "Ahrens gap" existed because individuals who had a constitu-
tional right to Habeas Corpus were not able to avail themselves of
that right under the statutory grant. Because of that gap between
the constitutional right and the jurisdictional statute, the appel-
late court necessarily revisited the first principles upon which the
right was based for guidance. 146 In explaining Eisentrager, the
Rasul Court discussed that gap.147 The Court then declared that
the gap had been remedied by Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit of
Kentucky. 148 Because there was no longer a gap between Con-
Executive restraint." Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 218-19
(1953) (Black, J., dissenting).
138. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475-76.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 476.
142. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
143. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 466.
144. Id. at 476.
145. Id. (citing Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948)).
146. Id. at 476-77.
147. Id. at 478.
148. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478-79 (citing Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct. of Ky., 410 U.S.
484, 495 (1973)).
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gress' jurisdictional grant to the courts and the constitutional
right, the Court did not have to resort to the "fundamental" ques-
tion of the constitutional right. It did not, however, criticize the
lower court for doing so in Eisentrager. 149
Lastly, the Court held that U.S. law unequivocally applies in
Guantanamo Bay. 150 The Court found the express terms of the
agreement between the United States and Cuba to give U.S. law
"complete jurisdiction and control" over the base. 151 As a d6noue-
ment, the Court pointed out that "[a]pplication of the Habeas
statute to persons detained at the base is consistent with the his-
torical reach of the Writ of Habeas Corpus." 152 The Court cited to
English common law history wherein the 'Writ depended not on
formal notions of territorial sovereignty, but rather on the practi-
cal question of 'the exact extent and nature of the jurisdiction or
dominion exercised in fact by the Crown."' 153
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court declined to decide the Sus-
pension Clause issue in an anticlimactic footnote. 154 Although the
case reached the Supreme Court after the DTA had purported to
strip jurisdiction over Habeas cases, it was initially filed before
the DTA took effect, and the Court held that the DTA did not ap-
ply in that particular case. 155
III. ANALYSIS
The survival of the DTA's jurisdiction-stripping provisions de-
pends on how the Supreme Court will interpret the Suspension
Clause and its previous jurisprudence in Eisentrager, St. Cyr, and
Rasul. By looking at the impact the statute will have in practice,
one can predict that there will be consequences, perhaps unin-
tended by the drafters of the DTA, that directly contravene values
echoed in all three cases. While the Constitution does provide for
the removal of the right to Habeas Corpus by Congress, it does so
only in limited circumstances. 156 The Court will be hard pressed
to find that the current statute satisfies the requirements for sus-
149. Id.
150. Id. at 480.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 481-82 (citing King v. Cowle, 97 Eng. Rep. 587, 598-99 (K.B.); Ex parte
Mwenya, (1960) 1 Q.B. 241, 303 (C.A.) (Lord Evershed, M.R.)).
153. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 482 (citing Cowle, 97 Eng. Rep. at 598-99; Ex parte Mwenya, 1
Q.B. at 303)).
154. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2764 n.15 (2006).
155. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2764-66.
156. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
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pension. Because the DTA will likely not pass muster under the
Suspension Clause, the Court will be forced to address the under-
lying historical and constitutional arguments first brought up by
the appeals court in Eisentrager, later echoed in St. Cyr, and art-
fully avoided in Rasul. If the Court finds that there is, in fact, a
right based in the Constitution absent a jurisdictional grant, it
will still have to answer more nuanced questions regarding where
and in what form such a petition might be brought, and whether a
right based on the Constitution, and not a statute, applies to non-
citizens. Lastly, assuming such a right does exist and can be exer-
cised by aliens, the Court must still fully address when the right
attaches. In doing so, the Court will need to weigh the Executive's
need for flexibility, given the nature of modern warfare, against
the deleterious effects on the balance of powers that naturally re-
sult when one branch's power is unchecked.
A. Implications of the Detainee Treatment Act
As the DTA is written, there is still the possibility for a non-
combatant detainee to be held permanently without any way to
challenge his detention, thus contravening one of the basic prem-
ises of the Rasul decision. The statute does allow a detainee to
challenge the finding that he is a combatant on procedural
grounds. 157 However, it does not allow him to challenge the deten-
tion itself after his non-combatant status has been determined by
the tribunal, and it removes the right to appeal the nature of the
detention. 158 Thus, theoretically, a detainee can be held under
inhumane conditions for an interminable amount of time without
any recourse after being declared a non-combatant. 159
Given these two new rules, it is possible for a Guantanamo Bay
detainee to be declared an enemy combatant, to appeal that find-
ing to the D.C. Circuit Court, to have the D.C. Circuit remand the
case for another CSRT hearing, to be found a non-combatant, and
yet to remain a detainee. The detainee's right to challenge his
detention has been foreclosed. The only action he can legally chal-
lenge is the non-combatant determination, which would accom-
plish nothing. Effectively, the Executive Branch can keep an indi-
vidual at Guantanamo indefinitely simply because it feels that
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eventually it might find them useful, or because it finds it embar-
rassing to admit that it held an individual for years without any
ascertainable reason. 160
This is the same type of "gap" that the Rasul Court alluded to
when discussing the circuit court's decision in Eisentrager.161 The
court in Eisentrager was forced to analyze a situation where indi-
viduals within the country could not challenge their detention be-
cause of a jurisdictional hole created by the courts.162 The lower
court filled the gap in that case by going to the "fundamentals,"
meaning the Constitution. 163 The Supreme Court will likely be
forced to do the same here by reaching the constitutional right to
Habeas Corpus. The Court's only other recourse would be to find
that the DTA is a temporary suspension of Habeas, rather than a
blanket revocation.
1. Is the DTA an Invocation of the Suspension Clause?
Members of the Supreme Court may wish to defer to Congress
by attempting to find an invocation of the Suspension Clause au-
thority; but in the case of the DTA, that tactic will not succeed
without a serious departure from prior decisions. In order to de-
cide whether or not the statute is a legitimate, constitutional sus-
pension of Habeas, the Court must first look to the plain language
of both the clause and the statute in question. Second, it must
analyze the historical reasons the Suspension Clause was included
in the Constitution and the history of its use, as both are vital to
understanding the scope of Congress' power to suspend. Third,
the Court must apply its prior decisions concerning statutory in-
terpretation to the instant case in order to maintain a coherent
framework for future cases.
"The sweep of the Suspension Clause must be measured by ref-
erence to the intention of the Framers and their understanding of
what the Writ of Habeas Corpus meant at the time the Constitu-
tion was drafted."'164 This sentiment, first articulated by Chief
Justice Burger of the Supreme Court, has been largely echoed by
160. See, e.g., Qassim v. Bush, 407 F. Supp. 2d 198 (D.D.C. 2005).
161. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 478 (2004) ("Because subsequent decisions of this
Court have filled the statutory gap that had occasioned Eisentrager's resort to 'fundamen-
tals,' persons detained outside the territorial jurisdiction of any federal district court no
longer need rely on the Constitution as the source of their right to federal Habeas review.").
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 384 (1977) (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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the courts throughout the years. The Court has also recognized "a
long standing rule requiring a clear statement of congressional
intent to repeal Habeas jurisdiction."165 Justice Scalia stated that
the 1679 Habeas Corpus Act "makes clear that indefinite impris-
onment on reasonable suspicion is not an available option of
treatment for those accused of aiding the enemy, absent a suspen-
sion of the Writ."166 Taken together, these opinions form a mosaic
that stands for the basic, inviolate, proposition that when Con-
gress wishes to suspend Habeas Corpus it must do so expressly
and for a limited period, even in wartime, in order to meet consti-
tutional requirements.
The plain language of the Suspension Clause states that Habeas
may only be revoked in times of invasion or rebellion. 167 The DTA
revokes the Writ without requiring a finding of either. Nowhere
in the legislative history of the statute is there an allusion to a
finding of invasion or rebellion. In this case, were the Court to call
this a suspension, it would have to effectively supply the require-
ment itself. Some have argued that the Authorization of Use of
Military Force (AUMF) provides all the requisite findings for any
action along these lines, but the Court's decisions in Hamdi and
Rasul foreclose that conclusion. 
168
While there is certainly a colorable argument that the nation is
at war, a finding of invasion or rebellion is not necessarily a corol-
lary of that fact, as evidenced by the numerous wars the country
has fought without invoking the Suspension Clause. Further-
more, it is quite apparent from the law itself that Congress en-
acted the DTA's jurisdiction-stripping provisions based on its
power to confer jurisdiction on federal courts. The act makes no
mention of the Suspension Clause, instead referring to 28 U.S.C. §
2241, the jurisdictional statute conferring power on the lower
courts to hear Habeas petitions. 169 Rather than "suspending" the
right, the statute removes it completely. It seems that if Congress
were attempting to invoke the clause it would have couched the
DTA in terms that invoke at least the indicia of the constitutional
provision by making a determination that an invasion or rebellion
existed.
165. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 298 (2001).
166. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 564 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
167. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
168. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 507 (2004) (discussing the limitations of the AUMF).
169. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2680,
2742-44.
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The current set of facts bears very little resemblance to histori-
cal invocations of the Suspension Clause. 170 As discussed above,
the Framers of the Constitution firmly believed the right to Ha-
beas was virtually inviolate. 171 In fact, it was a difficult sell to
convince many of the member-states at the Convention to include
any authority to suspend the Writ, even under the most exigent
circumstances. 172 Given this strong historical presumption
against suspension, Congress has only suspended Habeas in very
rare circumstances, and then only with the clearest statements of
purpose. 173
Over the last 218 years, Habeas has been suspended by Con-
gress four times. 174 Each time, Congress clearly stated why the
Writ was being suspended, distinctly found that there was a dan-
ger to the public necessitating the suspension, and stated that the
Writ would be restored when the danger had passed. 175 Three of
the four instances came in the midst of a declared war. 176 The
fourth was enacted during an armed rebellion in a United States
territory. 1
77
The DTA does not state a purpose for removing the Writ, does
not have any specific findings regarding an invasion or rebellion,
does not state when the suspension will end, and most impor-
tantly, does not even mention the Suspension Clause. Perhaps all
the trappings of legitimacy that accompanied prior invocations of
the clause are not necessary; however, there certainly must be
some evidence that Congress was acting under the Suspension
Clause before the Supreme Court can determine that the action
was constitutionally authorized.
From a jurisprudential perspective, the question becomes
whether a complete removal of jurisdiction over a singular group
(aliens), in a singular geographical location (Cuba), for an inde-
170. See supra notes 70-86 and accompanying text.
171. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
172. See supra notes 87-98 and accompanying text.
173. See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, § 1, 12 Stat. 755; Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 4, 17
Stat. 14-15; Act of July 1, 1902, ch. 1369, § 5, 32 Stat. 692; Hawaiian Organic Act, ch. 339, §
67, 31 Stat. 153 (1900).
174. See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, § 1, 12 Stat. 755; Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 4, 17
Stat. 14-15; Act of July 1, 1902, ch. 1369, § 5, 32 Stat. 692; Hawaiian Organic Act, ch. 339, §
67, 31 Stat. 153.
175. See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, § 1, 12 Stat. 755; Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 4, 17
Stat. 14-15; Act of July 1, 1902, ch. 1369, § 5, 32 Stat. 692; Hawaiian Organic Act, ch. 339, §
67, 31 Stat. 153.
176. See Act of Mar. 3, 1863, ch. 81, § 1, 12 Stat. 755; Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 4, 17
Stat. 14-15; Act of July 1, 1902, ch. 1369, § 5, 32 Stat. 692.
177. Hawaiian Organic Act, ch. 339, § 67, 31 Stat. 153.
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terminate amount of time, constitutes, in essence, an invocation of
the Suspension Clause. Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Hamdi,
specifically stated that a legislative removal of Habeas Corpus
through enacting requirements "other than the common-law re-
quirement" of executive detention would effectively eviscerate the
Suspension Clause. 178 By Justice Scalia's logic, Habeas Corpus
was made a binary device by the Suspension Clause. It either
works in its totality or it is suspended. It is important to note,
however, that Scalia's dissent was based largely on Hamdi's U.S.
citizenship. 179 In Rasul, Scalia dissented again, arguing that the
same right that applied to Hamdi should not apply to Rasul be-
cause Rasul was not a citizen. 180
2. The Ahrens Gap
Analyzing the Suspension Clause from a historical perspective
inevitably leads to one conclusion - that the DTA is not a suspen-
sion. The necessary next step after such a determination is an
analysis of the statute in order to determine if it creates an im-
permissible statutory gap, requiring the Court to reach the consti-
tutional underpinnings of Habeas Corpus. Canons of constitu-
tional avoidance will strongly encourage the Court to find a way to
sidestep the issue by finding an avenue for detainees to exercise
their right to Habeas.
In St. Cyr, the Court engaged in just such an artful construction
to avoid deciding the issue of constitutionally-mandated Ha-
beas. 181 However, due to the straightforward language of the
DTA, the Court will likely be forced to reach, and decide, this con-
stitutional issue.
In this instance, the canons of statutory construction outlined in
St. Cyr will certainly come into play. In that case, the Court
stated that: (1) when one interpretation will "invoke the outer lim-
178. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 575 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ('The Suspen-
sion Clause of the Constitution, which carefully circumscribes the conditions under which
the Writ can be withheld, would be a sham if it could be evaded by congressional prescrip-
tion of requirements other than the common-law requirement of committal for criminal
prosecution that render the Writ, though available, unavailing. If the Suspension Clause
does not guarantee the citizen that he will either be tried or released, unless the conditions
for suspending the Writ exist and the grave action of suspending the Writ has been taken;
if it merely guarantees the citizen that he will not be detained unless Congress by ordinary
legislation says he can be detained; it guarantees him very little indeed.")
179. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 575 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
180. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 489 (2004).
181. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299-300 (2001).
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its of Congress' power" the Court requires a clear indication that
that was the intended result, and (2) when one construction
"would raise serious Constitutional problems," the Court will look
for other interpretations. 1
8 2
The two inquiries are connected in this case. Removing Habeas
is certainly at the outer limits of Congress' power. It is a drastic
step, only to be taken under specific conditions. The constitutional
problem stems from the Court's desire to avoid articulating a right
based in the Constitution for the first time - the right to Habeas
in the absence of a jurisdictional statute. The Court clearly stated
in St. Cyr that "[t]he fact that this Court would be required to an-
swer the difficult question of what the Suspension Clause protects
is in and of itself a reason to avoid answering the Constitutional
questions that would be raised by concluding that the review was
barred entirely." 18 3 Given this strong preference, the Court will
likely attempt the same sort of statutory gymnastics that it suc-
cessfully performed in St. Cyr. In this case, however, it is unlikely
that the Court will be as successful.
One of the statutes in question in St. Cyr was entitled
"ELIMINATION OF CUSTODY REVIEW BY HABEAS
CORPUS".184 The Court held that the title alone was not enough
to show congressional intent. 8 5 Because the statute's body merely
outlined changes to the Immigration Act, it did not meet the in-
tent standard.18 6 Another statute proffered by the Executive in
the case stated that "no court shall have jurisdiction to review any
final order of removal against an alien."'187 The Court distin-
guished "judicial review" from "Habeas Corpus," stating that a
withdrawal of one was not necessarily the withdrawal of the
other.'88 The Court acknowledged that in several places in the
statutory scheme, Habeas and judicial review language is used
together, but claimed that this only further muddied the waters
rather than showing any specific intent. 8 9 Lastly, the Court dis-
tinguished the so-called "zipper clause," which required all ap-
peals of I.N.S. decisions to be brought in a specific appellate
182. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 299-300.
183. Id. at 301 n.13.
184. Id. at 309 n.31 (capitalization in original).
185. Id. at 309.
186. Id. at 311.
187. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 311.
188. Id. at 312.
189. Id. at 313 n.35.
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court. 190 The Court held that because the provision only applied
"with respect to review of an order of removal under subsection
[1252](a)(1)," 191 it did not apply to the Court's ability to adjudicate
Habeas Corpus petitions not governed by the statute. 192
The current framework provides:
Except as provided in section 1005 of the Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005, no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction
to hear or consider-
(1) an application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by or on
behalf of an alien detained by the Department of Defense at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; or
(2) any other action against the U.S. or its agents relating to
any aspect of the detention by the Department of Defense of
an alien at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who-
(A) is currently in military custody; or
(B) has been determined by the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit in accordance with the proce-
dures set forth in section 1005(e) of the Detainee Treatment
Act of 2005 to have been properly detained as an enemy com-
batant. 193
The statute in St. Cyr and the DTA are functionally similar in
that they attempt to remove the federal courts' ability to review
detention by the Executive. While the language, if not the title, of
the DTA is certainly more explicit than that of the St. Cyr statute,
there is no bright line rule to decide what is "explicit enough."
A cynical view of the Court's actions may lead one to believe
that, regardless of the language, the Court's desire to avoid the
hard constitutional question will lead a majority of justices to find
that Congress has not sufficiently expressed an intention to abro-
gate the right outlined in Rasul. If "ELIMINATION OF
CUSTODY REVIEW BY HABEAS CORPUS" was insufficient in
St. Cyr, it is plausible that the statute language "no court, justice,
190. Id. at 313.
191. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 313.
192. Id.
193. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2680,
2742-44.
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or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider ... an applica-
tion for a Writ of Habeas Corpus" may not be adequate either. 194
Another possible interpretation is that the statute is legal to the
extent that the current process designed by the military supplants
Habeas Corpus. However, to the extent that the remedy is "in-
adequate or ineffective," Habeas Corpus remains. 195 The Court
has already used this logic in United States v. Hayman, 196 when it
held that the substitution of another remedy does not suspend
Habeas Corpus. 197 This logic would allow the Court to keep the
current system in place for detainees who are determined to be
combatants, but would allow for Habeas Corpus for those found to
be non-combatants. The problem with this interpretation is that
the remedy that does exist is an extremely limited one, and in re-
ality does not protect any rights. The only time the remedy is
adequate is when someone is determined to be a combatant in a
legitimate proceeding, at which point the Court is willing to cede
almost complete power to the Executive.
The most likely determination by the Court in the instant case
is that DTA is a complete bar to Habeas. While this contravenes
the strong desire to avoid the constitutional question, no other
interpretation makes as much sense. The statute specifically re-
moves all avenues to Habeas from all courts. 198 The St. Cyr stat-
ute attempted the same course of action, but its text was not as
explicit. By foreclosing not only the standard right to Habeas, but
also all other claims against the Executive stemming from deten-
tion, Congress was very clear that it intended the DTA to be a
complete jurisdictional bar. Because it is a complete bar in its
current form, the Court will be forced to address the gap in the
same way as the appeals court in Eisentrager - by addressing the
underlying constitutional principles.
194. Id.
195. Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372, 381 (1977).
196. 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
197. Swain, 430 U.S. at 381 ("'The Court implicitly held in Hayman, as we hold in this
case, that the substitution of a collateral remedy which is neither inadequate nor ineffec-
tive to test the legality of a person's detention does not constitute a suspension of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus.")




B. A Constitutional Right to Habeas Under the Suspension
Clause
The prisoners in Rasul and Hamdi did not argue for a constitu-
tional right to Habeas Corpus, and the Court took great pains to
not decide the issue.199 In Hamdan, the appellant did argue that
the Suspension Clause applied, but the Court avoided the argu-
ment based on the fact that Hamdan's case had already been filed
when the DTA was enacted. The next case that reaches the Court
from Guantanamo Bay by a detainee who filed after the DTA went
into effect will essentially force the Court to address the issue of
whether the Suspension Clause creates a constitutional right to
Habeas Corpus in the absence of a jurisdictional statute.
If the Court determines the DTA is unconstitutional in its pre-
sent form, but still believes a right should exist, they will have to
address the Eisentrager circuit court's constitutional analysis. A
historical analysis of the right coupled with an examination of
prior cases before the Court will likely lead to the conclusion that
the right does exist independent of any action by Congress. Fol-
lowing the constitutionality determination, the Court will have to
examine the Executive's current activities and decide if they are
reviewable through Habeas Corpus. Further, there will have to be
a finding that the right applies to non-citizens if it is to be effec-
tive in the case. Lastly, if the Court does determine that the right
attaches, it will still have to determine by what means a detainee
can assert the right.
Any analysis of a constitutional issue must necessarily begin
with an examination of the Framers' intent when they included
the provision. In this instance, it is clear that the Framers be-
lieved that the right existed independent of any jurisdictional
grant by Congress. 200 Preventing unchecked power was perhaps
the most fundamental goal of the new Constitution, and by pro-
tecting the right to Habeas Corpus, along with articulating spe-
cific enumerated powers, the Framers performed the all-important
task of restricting the powers of the Executive and Legislative
Branches. Some members of the Constitutional Convention
wanted the right to be absolute; others argued for a limited right
199. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 489 n.1 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (see Tr. of Oral
Arg. 5 ("Question: And you don't raise the issue of any potential jurisdiction on the basis of
the Constitution alone. We are here debating the jurisdiction under the Habeas Statute, is
that right? [Answer]: That's correct .... ").
200. See supra notes 78-98 and accompanying text.
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to suspend Habeas in extreme circumstances. 20 1 Every state at
the Convention supported a fundamental right to Habeas, and
three voted against the existing provision because it gave Con-
gress the power to suspend. 2 2 History unequivocally shows that,
as Englishmen, the Framers considered Habeas their birthright,
and as Americans, they considered it indispensable to the preven-
tion of tyranny. 20 3 The right was to exist untouched unless a na-
tional emergency dictated otherwise, and then only for a short
time. 204
A textual and structural analysis of the Suspension Clause fur-
ther supports the existence of the right absent a statute. The
right is included in the Constitution alongside other clauses meant
to limit the powers of government. The inclusion of the right in
the Constitution is a means of ensuring its existence regardless of
the activities of the various branches, short of a constitutional
amendment.
When considered together with the specific limitations placed on
the suspension of the Writ, one can easily see a workable system
of checks and balances that depends on the right. The right must
exist to prevent the Executive from unlawfully imprisoning indi-
viduals, and Congress may not cede power to the Executive to de-
termine when the right can be suspended. Congress alone has
authority to suspend the right, and it may only do so in cases of
rebellion or invasion. The Framers implicitly stated that the right
is a fundamental check on the powers of government by placing it
alongside the "ex post facto" and "Title of Nobility" clauses.
20 5
They explicitly stated when it could be suspended. In all other
instances, regardless of the actions of either the Executive or the
Legislature, the right can be exercised.
Another view of the Suspension Clause postulated by the Court
is that it places an affirmative duty upon Congress to establish
access to Habeas Corpus. When this concept is coupled with Jus-
tice Scalia's analysis of Congress' power under the Suspension
Clause, an interesting mosaic emerges. Congress must provide
the Writ unless it expressly chooses to suspend it, but it cannot
mitigate the Writ through limitation to the point of uselessness.
201. See supra notes 90-91 and accompanying text.
202. FARRAND, supra note 89, at 438.
203. See supra notes 78-98 and accompanying text; see also FARRAND, supra note 89, at
341.
204. FARRAND, supra note 89, at 438.
205. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2, 3, 8.
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Other cases have determined that Congress is subject to a "consti-
tutional command" to create an avenue for availing oneself of the
Writ.206 If there is such a "command" based on the Constitution,
short of determining that the DTA is an explicit suspension of the
Writ, the statute would have to be found unconstitutional by the
Court.
The Court has on several occasions alluded to a constitutional
right to Habeas without ever formally adopting a position that the
right does exist absent the enabling statute.2 7 The reason for the
allusions to the right, rather than an explicit holding, is Ex Parte
Bollman.208 In that case Justice Marshall seemed to state in dicta
that the right required a statute. 20 9  This decision has been
roundly denounced by scholars for its political undertones.
210
Largely ignored by the Court, Bollman's existence is the last bar-
rier the Court will have to overcome in order to explicitly hold that
Habeas Corpus exists without congressional action.
On its face, Ex Parte McCardle21 supports those in favor of ju-
risdiction stripping, but in reality, it is not helpful. The case in-
volved a Confederate private citizen who filed a Writ of Habeas
Corpus after being jailed in the federal brig.212 Congress stripped
the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over Habeas based on a
jurisdictional statute. 21 3 Whenever a statute is passed, even a
jurisdictional statute, the Court may still decide whether or not
the statute is constitutional. 21 4 In that case, the Court held Con-
gress had the power to strip the appellate jurisdiction of the
courts. 
2 15
While Ex Parte McCardle accepted congressional jurisdiction
stripping, at the time of the decision, the Judiciary Act of 1789
gave the Court the ability to grant an original Writ, effectively
giving McCardle another way to reach the Court with his Habeas
206. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236, 238 (1973).
207. See, e.g., Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 477 (2004) (acknowledging a separate consti-
tutional right to Habeas); I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 305 (2001) (rejecting statutory con-
structions that might conflict with the right to Habeas); McNally v. Hill, 239 U.S. 131, 135
(1934) (accepting that the Constitution implicitly recognizes a right to Habeas); Ex Parte
Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 130-31 (1866) (discussing the difference between suspending the writ
and suspending the privilege).
208. Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. 75 (1807).
209. Bollman, 8 U.S. 75.
210. Duker, supra note 46, at 135; see generally Freedman, supra note 88.
211. Ex Parte McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868).
212. McCardle, 74 U.S. 506 (1868).
213. Id. at 513.
214. Id.
215. Id.
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petition. 216 If McCardle had filed under section fourteen of the
1789 Judiciary Act, he would have been able to maintain his
case. 217 The Court was not faced with the decision of allowing
Congress to completely cut off a prisoner's right to Habeas. There-
fore, McCardle is not dispositive, as some who favor Congress' ac-
tion would like to believe. In Ex Parte Yerger, the Court held that
section fourteen of the Judiciary Act still gave the Court jurisdic-
tion over Habeas under facts very similar to those in McCardle,
showing that the Court believed that its decision in McCardle did
not truly remove its power to review Habeas cases.
218
Rasul and St. Cyr are the most vital cases to the current analy-
sis. Both cases consistently suggest that the right exists apart
from a congressional grant due to its historical common law tradi-
tion. In Rasul, the Court pointed out that the Writ exists "antece-
dent to statute" and should be enforced for prisoners in Guan-
tanamo. 21 9 In St. Cyr, the Court stated that, at a minimum, the
right to Habeas exists as it did when the Constitution was writ-
ten.220 When the Constitution was written, the right to Habeas
did not depend on any one statute, rather it was embedded in the
common law. 221 To argue otherwise would be to say that on the
day the Constitution was ratified the right did not exist. This
proposition is untenable, given that in 1789 any judge sitting in
equity could receive a Habeas petition.
222
The St. Cyr Court held that an interpretation of Habeas Corpus
based on a 1789 understanding of the law would support review-
ing any executive detention, because "it is in that context that its
protections have been strongest. 223 While the Court has done its
best to not decide this issue in an attempt to avoid explicitly de-
nouncing Bollman's dicta, this situation presents no other option.
The Court will likely have to acknowledge that the right to Ha-
beas Corpus, as included in the Constitution, exists without any
explicit congressional action.
The current situation, unreviewable detention by the Executive,
is almost certainly what the constitutional right to Habeas was
meant to protect against. If one examines the history of Habeas
216. Id.
217. McCardle, 74 U.S. at 513 (1868).
218. Ex Parte Yerger, 75 U.S. 85 (1869).
219. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 473 (2004).
220. I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001).
221. See supra notes 78-98 and accompanying text.
222. Id.
223. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. at 301.
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back to its inception in England, this is perhaps the most impor-
tant reason for its existence. When the English nobility forced
King John to sign the Magna Carta, they were not concerned with
ensuring review of their rights at trial, they were ensuring their
right to not be held indefinitely without good reason. 224 Because
the Executive's activities, which Congress is attempting to protect
through the DTA, are clearly implicated in the history of Habeas
Corpus, the Court will have to find the statute unconstitutional
per the Suspension Clause.
C. Exercising the Constitutional Right
Upon determining that the right to Habeas exists without a
statute, the Court will have to address how exactly a prisoner can
exercise the right. The DTA purports to remove from any "court,
justice, or judge" the ability to consider a Writ. 225 This language
was undoubtedly drafted to remove the possibility of an original
Writ not only being issued by a sitting court, but also to prevent
an individual justice of the Court from issuing a Writ. Justices
have had the power to issue Writs personally since the inception of
Habeas Corpus jurisdictional statutes.
226
As pointed out by Professor Hartnett, without this power to is-
sue Writs in the first instance, an untenable constitutional conun-
drum exists. 227 If the Supreme Court cannot hear original Writs
without a jurisdiction grant, if the state courts cannot review fed-
eral detention, if Congress is not required to make inferior federal
courts, and if the Suspension Clause by implication imbues the
right to the Writ to all, we are left with a contradictory system.228
If Congress chose not to create lower courts, no entity would be
able to hear a Habeas petition in the first instance, so no one
would be able to exercise his constitutional right to Habeas. Ha-
beas Corpus would effectively be permanently suspended if Con-
gress did not create lower courts and no inherent original jurisdic-
tion existed in the Court.
224. 5 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 487, 503 (P.J. Marshall ed.,
1988).
225. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2680,
2742-44.
226. See Edward A. Hartnett, The Constitutional Puzzle of Habeas Corpus, 46 B.C. L.
REV. 251, 271 (2005).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 255-56.
Summer 2007
Duquesne Law Review
Professor Hartnett's analysis is premised on the underlying
statutory grant to the individual justices, but his conclusion does
account for a complete removal of the grant. 229 He postulates that
under a scheme that removes the power of any court to hear a
Writ and removes the power of individual justices to do so, the
Court would be forced to find a violation of the Suspension
Clause.230
One possible solution to this problem is to say that, while a ju-
risdictional statute is necessary for any case not covered by the
Court's Article III jurisdiction generally, Habeas Corpus is an ex-
ception. Given the Framers' placement of the right in the Consti-
tution specifically, one could make the argument that it should be
lumped in with the cases and controversies outlined in Article III.
The Framers likely viewed the right to issue Writs as inherent
in the courts. They likely saw no need, past authorizing the exis-
tence of the Court, to further outline the Court's right to hear the
petitions because Habeas petitions had been heard throughout the
colonies with or without an enabling statute for decades. 231 In
fact, the Suspension Clause might lead one to the exact opposite
conclusion - that an affirmative act of Congress in times of insur-
rection or rebellion would be the only possible way the Writ could
be removed from the Court, and a jurisdictional statute was never
necessary for the court to hear extraordinary Writs in the first
place.
Another possible solution involves the Court's analysis of where
a detainee can sue. The Court in Rasul affirmed the position that
the location of the detainee does not matter if the jailer is readily
available when it stated "the Writ of Habeas Corpus does not act
upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon the person who holds
him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody."232 The Court went
even further and reaffirmed its position in Ahrens stating, a "peti-
tioner's absence from the district does not present a jurisdictional
obstacle to the consideration of the claim."
233
229. Id. at 290.
230. Id.
231. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
232. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 478 (2004) (citing Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir. Ct. of
Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494-95 (1973)).
233. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 536 (citing Braden, 410 U.S. at 498 (citing Burns v. Wilson, 346
U.S. 137 (1953), rehearing denied, 346 U.S. 844, 851-852 (opinion of Frankfurter, J.);
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955); Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S.
197, 199 (1948) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
692 Vol. 45
Habeas Corpus
The question must then be asked - does the jurisdictional
clause in the DTA change the analysis? The DTA purports to
modify the jurisdictional grant, removing the right from non-
citizens in Guantanamo Bay. However, given the Court's hold-
ings, this may not matter. If the Court chooses to look at the stat-
ute granting jurisdiction solely from the point of view of the jailer
and not the jailed, the fact that the detainees are in Guantanamo
Bay does not matter at all. As long as the statute can still reach
those in charge of their detention - the President and the Secre-
taries of Navy and Defense - the Court may be able to find that
the detainees can file Habeas Corpus petitions.
Once an avenue for exercising the right is found, the Court must
still determine whether a right based in the Constitution extends
to non-citizen detainees. Given their prior jurisprudence and the
history of the Writ, it seems that the Court will likely find in favor
of the alien detainees on this point. In Eisentrager, the Court spe-
cifically addressed the constitutional right to Habeas by articulat-
ing several factors that would form the framework for deciding if
someone had a right to file a petition. 23 4 The Court in Rasul ap-
plied those factors and concluded that Guantanamo detainees met
them. 235 The Rasul decision expressly stated that "[a]liens held at
the [Guantanamo] base, no less than American citizens, are enti-
tled to invoke the federal courts' authority under § 2241. '"236 The
Court was willing to allow detainees jurisdiction under the Ha-
beas jurisdictional statute. If the Court was willing to recognize a
constitutional right, there is very little evidence that that right
would not apply to non-citizens and citizens alike.
D. Can Congress and the Executive Create an Unreviewable Ju-
risdictional "Black Hole" in Cuba?
The majority opinion in Rasul unequivocally held that U.S. law
applies in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. 237 That territory is considered
part of the United States for the purposes of any legal analysis.
The Executive acknowledges that citizen-detainees in Guan-
tanamo Bay would normally have the right to Habeas Corpus and
all other legal rights.238 Effectively, the DTA could just as easily
have taken jurisdiction over Habeas Corpus away from naval brigs
234. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777 (1950).
235. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 475-76.
236. Id. at 481.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 481.
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in Norfolk, Virginia, or Key West, Florida. Given the lack of any
special treatment of the Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, is there
a coherent argument for removing jurisdiction over this one class
of persons?
Ostensibly, the Executive would argue that it does make sense,
given the necessities of the unconventional war being waged
around the globe. It is doubtful that the Court would agree with
this position, as it has held that "[w]hatever power the United
States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges
with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of con-
flict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when
individual liberties are at stake."
239
While the Court does give a significant amount of deference to
the scope of Executive power in wartime, it is not absolute. 240 In
this instance, like in Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Rasul, the
factors outlined in Eisentrager will likely guide the Court's analy-
sis of Executive action. 241 It seems to'be an especially apt test be-
cause, in the words of Justice Kennedy, "Eisentrager considered
the scope of the right to petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus
against the backdrop of the Constitutional command of the sepa-
ration of powers.
242
The Eisentrager factors are: alienage, the place of detention, the
combatant/non-combatant status of the detainee, and the extent to
which affording the detainees Habeas Corpus would affect the war
effort. 243 Just as in Rasul, all of these factors point towards allow-
ing Habeas Corpus for the detainees. 244 While the Executive and
Congress may argue that the current scheme allows for some re-
239. Hamdi v. Rusmfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (stating that it was "the central judgment of the Framers of the Con-
stitution that, within our political scheme, the separation of governmental powers into
three coordinate Branches is essential to the preservation of liberty")).
240. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 613 (1952);
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 536 ("Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the
Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of
conflict, it most assuredly ensures a role for all three branches when individual liberties are
at stake.") (citing Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 380).
241. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 485 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("In my view, the correct course is
to follow the framework of Eisentrager.").
242. Id. at 485-86.
243. Id. at 487-88.
244. Id. ("The facts here are distinguishable from those in Eisentrager in two critical
ways, leading to the conclusion that a federal court may entertain the petitions. First,
Guantanamo Bay is in every practical respect a United States territory, and it is one far
removed from any hostilities .... The second critical set of facts is that the detainees at




view, it does not allow for review of the substantive outcome of the
military's hearings. Detainees can still be held indefinitely after
they are determined to be non-combatants. "Indefinite detention
without trial or other proceeding presents altogether different
considerations .... It suggests a weaker case of military necessity
and much greater alignment with the traditional function of Ha-
beas Corpus."
245
E. Are There Avenues Besides Habeas for the Detainees?
Other avenues exist for challenging one's detention by the Ex-
ecutive. 246 The Court has held that while an act may remove ju-
risdiction from the courts, the act in and of itself must still be con-
stitutional and is reviewable for that purpose. 247 The detainees
might bring Writs of Mandamus, Bivens actions, or file under the
All Writs Act. The problem with bringing any of these actions is
the second clause of the DTA. The language that will be the most
damning to the constitutionality of the DTA states that a prisoner
may not bring "any other action against the United States or its
agents relating to any aspect of ... [his] detention .. ".. ,248 The
question is then posed, to what extent will the Court allow an al-
most total removal of rights from a non-citizen detained in a place
where the Court has already stated that U.S. law unequivocally
applies?
Setting aside a challenge of the constitutionality of the underly-
ing statute, given the blanketing nature of the DTA, can a de-
tainee seek relief through any other action? A literal reading of
the DTA makes that seem unlikely. However, a colorable argu-
ment can be made for allowing what are effectively federal com-
mon law claims to exist even after the DTA. A Bivens action is
based solely on the Constitution, and does not require a statutory
grant.249 While Congress was undeniably attempting to remove
Bivens actions as well, the issue of removing a common law cause
of action through affirmative jurisdiction stripping has never been
fully litigated, and the avenue may be open to the detainees.
245. Id. at 488.
246. JENNIFER K. ELSEA & KENNETH THOMAS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
GUANTANAMO DETAINEES: HABEAS CORPUS CHALLENGES IN FEDERAL COURT 17 (2006).
247. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968).
248. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2680,
2742-44.




Given the standard of review Congress has required, appellants
may also be able to challenge the DTA as a facially unconstitu-
tional assault on the separation of powers. The DTA requires the
D.C. Circuit Court to review only whether or not the Defense De-
partment has met its own standards for determining the status of
a detainee. 250 Once the Court has determined this, ostensibly, the
case is over, and the detainee goes back to Guantanamo Bay.
In a situation where the Court finds that the Defense Depart-
ment has not met its own standards, it appears the next step
would be a retrial before the CSRT, as the release of a detainee
prior to combatant determination would raise obvious problems.
During this entire process, the detainee would remain, of course,
detained. Furthermore, even if the detainee was found to be a
non-combatant after his retrial, his release would be by no means
guaranteed. 251
In Hayburn's Case, the Court held that a jurisdictional grant of
power by Congress to the courts which allowed for further review
by the Secretary of War was unconstitutional because "no decision
of any court of the United States can, under any circumstances...
be liable to a revision, or even suspension, by the [LIegislature
itself, in whom no judicial power of any kind appears to be
vested."252 In that case, just as in the current situation, Congress
gave the Executive Branch, and specifically the military, the
power to suspend a decision of the courts. 253 In this case, Con-
gress has removed the power of the Court to reach the merits of a
case or to bring any measure of finality to the controversy; there-
fore, a colorable argument can be made that it, too, is unconstitu-
tional.
F. The Indefinite Nature of Warfare in the Modern World
The idea that this "war" should be fought under a different ru-
bric than any before was addressed tangentially by the majority
opinion in Rasul.25 4 In Hamdi, the same issue was a major point
of the majority opinion. 255 In that case, the Court clearly stated
250. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e), 119 Stat. 2680,
2742-44.
251. See, e.g., Qassim v. Bush, 407 F. Supp. 2d 198 (D.D.C. 2005).
252. Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. 408, 410 (1792).
253. Hayburn, 2 U.S. at 410.
254. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 488 (2004).
255. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 520 (2004).
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that detention, without a combatant determination, is not legal.256
However, the pure mechanics of the current statute would make it
allowable. The Court in Hamdi acknowledged that the indefinite
nature of the current conflict made long-term detention a real pos-
sibility. 257 The Court was unwilling to give the Executive carte
blanche to continue a practice of holding individuals indefi-
nitely. 258 In fact, the Court specifically stated that the Authoriza-
tion of Use of Military Force (AUMF) did not grant the Executive
the power to hold individuals indefinitely for the purpose of inter-
rogation. 2
59
In instances where the Executive has determined that an indi-
vidual is not a combatant, the grant of power to the Executive to
hold individuals in times of war dissipates, and another logical
conclusion for the detention must be drawn. 260 In the absence of
an exceptional justification articulated by the Executive, the only
reasonable conclusion is that the individual, regardless of his
combatant status, has some intrinsic value to the Executive, ei-
ther as an intelligence asset or as a bargaining chip.
The Hamdi Court specifically stated that individuals deter-
mined to be combatants could be held for the "duration of these
hostilities. '' 261 In an effort to show that hostilities were ongoing at
the time of the decision, the Court pointed to news reports of fight-
ing in Afghanistan. 262 This logic presents severe problems given
the paradigm shift in warfare.
The Court is presented with what can only be described as the
farcical task of comparing the War on Terror to the Battle at
Runnymede. When battles between sovereigns are finished, com-
batants lay down their arms. The current battle, however, has no
end, no beginning, and no opposing sovereign nation. To argue for
any "duration of the hostilities standard" is to grasp at air. There
will be no victory declared, no treaty signed, no armistice. There
will only be a slow, deliberate wearing down of one side by the
other.
256. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 520.
257. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 563.
258. Id. at 536 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 587
(1952)).
259. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 521.
260. Id. at 536.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 521 (citing Pamela Constable, U.S. Launches New Operation in Afghanistan,
WASH. POST, Mar. 14, 2004, at A22).
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Given the nebulous nature of the standards at play and the pos-
sibility of detention long after an appeal to the circuit court has
been exhausted, it is quite possible that the Supreme Court, given
its decisions in Hamdi and Rasul, will take issue with the statute
as currently written, unless it can find a way to still provide de-
tainees with a method by which they can avail themselves of the
Great Writ.
IV. RECOMMENDATION
While there are multiple ways for the Court to approach the
constitutional problems stemming from the DTA, the only ap-
proach that brings clarity and finality to the situation in Guan-
tanamo Bay is to find the statute is an unconstitutional violation
of the Suspension Clause. If the Court instead engages in St. Cyr-
like semantics and jurisdictional gymnastics in order to avoid the
constitutional issue, Congress will no doubt remove the alterna-
tive path to Habeas Corpus articulated by the Court.
By articulating the right as inherent in the Constitution and in-
dependent of any jurisdictional statute, the Court would effectuate
the intent of the Framers. A clear constitutional decision would
also allow Congress and the Executive to modify their behavior in
order to effectively fight the war on terror without the constant
nuisance of court battles. Specific changes to the statutory
scheme can be made that protect the right as articulated by the
Court, while still allowing for detention sans Habeas when a de-
tainee is determined to be a combatant.
The Supreme Court should embrace the appellate court's logic
from Eisentrager that the right to file a Writ exists in the absence
of a jurisdictional statute. The Eisentrager Court based its deci-
sion on three premises, which are completely supported by a his-
torical analysis of the right. First, Habeas is an inherent common
law right. Second, the Constitution limits the suspension of Ha-
beas to very specific circumstances to the exclusion of all other
reasons for suspension. Third, Congress cannot succeed in limit-
ing Habeas by electing to not enact a jurisdictional statute if it is
constitutionally restricted from limiting it through affirmative
action.
While Congress indisputably has the power to remove and/or
change the jurisdiction of the courts, it does not have the power to
remove the opportunity to avail oneself of constitutional rights.
Because a specific mechanism exists in the Constitution to remove
the right to Habeas Corpus, an end-run to remove jurisdiction
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cannot be considered a legitimate use of Congress' constitutionally
granted power over the courts. Furthermore, while the Court will
likely accept historically supported arguments that the Executive
can determine who is a combatant, and a combatant does not have
to be afforded the right to Habeas Corpus, it cannot accept indefi-
nite detention, especially in cases where the detainee has been
determined to be a non-combatant through the Executive's own
procedures.
In order to remove the DTA from any constitutional conundrum,
Congress need only change a few words, making it possible for a
detainee who has been adjudged a non-combatant to avail himself
of the courts. This is, of course, easier said than done. Such a
change would achieve the Executive's purported goals of prevent-
ing a flood of petitions from detainees, while giving due deference
to the Courts and to the notions of due process, a restrained Ex-
ecutive, and individual rights upon which the common law and the
United States are built.
If the language of the DTA were modified to remove the right
from detainees who have either been determined to be a combat-
ant, or who have not yet been determined a combatant and are
awaiting a CSRT, the Court would almost certainly uphold the
statute. By limiting the statute to only those individuals still con-
sidered to be involved in the war in some way, Congress would
appeal to the Court's desire to steer clear of the Executive's war-
time powers. At the same time, it would allow the Court to be-
come involved when an individual has been removed from the war
zone. The power to make this determination would still lie with
the Executive, allowing enough flexibility for continued opera-
tions.
The only additional change required to escape constitutional in-
validation would be a specific time requirement for the CSRT.
This limit would prevent the Executive from holding a detainee in
"pre-CSRT limbo" for an indeterminate amount of time. Without
this limitation, Justice Kennedy's concerns in Rasul, as outlined
by the Eisentrager standards, remain. By adding this require-
ment, the system would take on a more definite tenor and become
more palatable to the Court.
V. CONCLUSION
The underlying purpose of Habeas Corpus and the Suspension
Clause is to prevent unlawful Executive detention of non-
combatants. Under the current system, certain aspects of such
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detention cannot be challenged. While Congress does have the
power to regulate the federal courts' jurisdiction, it does not have
the power to remove the right to hear Habeas petitions. Because
this is what the DTA purports to accomplish, the Court will most
likely overturn the statute based on the constitutional right to
Habeas Corpus. If Congress wishes to maintain the current sys-
tem, it will have to change the statute to restore Habeas Corpus
and other federal causes of action to those individuals who have
been determined to be non-combatants.
